Many saw Print On Demand (POD) as the ultimate ‘just in
time’ production solution to book publishing, which would wipe out all the inefficiencies
of the ‘just in case’ approach that plagues the book supply chain. So why didn’t
it happen, or did it happen for some and not for others? Is there a new dawn,
or just a new set of people who have been sold a pup and not looked hard at the
facts?
Today we read that Barnes and Noble are installing Espresso
Book Machines in three of their store, including their New York flagship in
Union Square. Books-a-Million also has installed two in its stores last year
and Powells has one in Portland. But are all these genuine investment cases or
mere subsidised trails?
We are all aware of the huge success Ingram have made
with Lightning Source both in the US and UK and the substantial side benefit
this has given them with Ingram Digital and in acquiring digital content. Some
would suggest that other more single focused operations such as Rowe’s in the
UK have been less successful and in general, the main production presses have
continued to plough their own furrows. Amazon acquired Booksurge which has now
morphed into CreateSpace and has been aligned closely with their Kindle KDP and
Audible self-publishing offers. In 2012 Kodak entered into the space with a
strategic alliance with Espresso to site POD machine in non book outlets to
also service their picture kiosk offer and although two machines were installed
in Bartell Drug Stores near Seattle, this apparently has failed to impress
Kodak.
In the UK Blackwells installed an Espresso POD machine in
their Charring Cross store. There were many mistakes made, with the machine not
only taking up valuable retail space, but often being unmanned, as staff wanted
to sell books and didn’t want that ‘monitor’ position. The customer also had to
often wait, either for someone to operate it, or just for a book to be spat out.
Best of all, they had so much faith in its ability to drive sales, they tried
to hide the machine around a corner. They didn’t know its audience and it was
poorly marketed both within the store and to a wider audience.
The challenge is not the technology, it’s with its adaption
and adoption, subsequent return on investment for all and perceived added consumer
value. It’s also like eInk technology, in that it looks great and is capable of
delivering, but if it takes too long, or the wrong strategy is adopted, it can
be overtaken and merely becomes transient technology.
Many suggested that POD would solve many environmental
issues but we would suggest that they first may wish to also look closer at the
technology and paper stock used in the current machines.
The challenge is that POD means many things to many
people.
To some it is a substitute for short print runs. One
academic publisher very successfully could predict sales of its back list, so it
set thresholds at which POD kicked in and replenished inventory according to
forecasted demand and in doing so kept high priced books in stock. It even only
had one location worldwide to service distributed hubs and they could afford to
fly it around the world once sold. POD can work on predicable sale patterns and
high ticket books.
Others waited until the backlist book inventory hit the
bottom and operated on sell one make one basis, again ensuring the book
remained in stock and obviated the ‘reprint under consideration’ lost orders
and print gambles.
Some printed more POD stock than was healthy and used
POD to simply reduce their print run exposure and inflated the price to pay for
this higher ticket item. Interestingly, ask those POD operators if the print
singles or bulk orders first? Also like any machine they return the best
investment if they operate flat out and not intermittently between the hours of
9 till 5.
However, the big challenge for many was the basic model.
All tended to stick with the print and distribute model and this was
personified by Ingram who printed and then distributed, either on a pick, pack
and dispatch direct to order, or more frequently indirect to stock. The real
opportunity was to flip from ‘print and distribute’ to ‘distribute and print’
and bring the manufacture closer to the consumer. But to do so one now has to
ask what is ‘local’ in a world were delivery is shrinking to same day?
So why do we think that the Barnes and Noble ‘test’ is irrelevant?
Firstly, unless the service is perceived as universal then it has questionable
marketing advantage and real cost and service issues as there will be more ‘only
available at limited stores’ and less ‘available here.’ We don’t envisage a
return to the 17 and 18th printer within the shop and the machines are not
going to shrink to a desktop today. We do however see it working within institutions
and public libraries who often have different needs, service offers and return
on investment critique.
So who could be a winner apart from Ingram? Well this is
yet another lesson being taught by Amazon, who, by reducing their delivery
times to even same day, have potentially removed the ‘local’ issue. If the can
buy online and have it turned around in the same timescale as a traditionally
printed book, will the customer care if it’s POD or traditional? Amazon has
also gone for the classic sell one make one model that aligns to self
publishing and positioned it alongside KDP and their Audible self publishing
offers. Tomorrow they are in a great position to now offer the same service to
publishers and retailers who wish to reduce stock but increase availability.
Maybe Booksurge was a very canny buy and under CreateSpace can become another
part of an increasingly well thought through and formidable holistic offer.
